Turkey says it has blocked access to 2,034 social media accounts over two months, citing terrorism, disinformation and threats to national security. The announcement followed separately reported restrictions on X affecting a news outlet, a photographer and writer, and a network formed by detainees’ families.
In a statement on 4 September 2026, presidential communications director Burhanettin Duran said 699 accounts had been blocked over alleged links to terrorist or criminal organisations. He specifically highlighted alleged Gülen movement links within that group, but did not say how many of the 699 accounts fell into that category.
A further 1,335 accounts were blocked after authorities accused them of spreading disinformation, provoking unrest or conducting what Duran described as “psychological operations” against Turkey. He said the work involved prosecutors, police cybercrime teams and other government bodies, coordinated by his directorate.
Duran presented the measures as necessary to protect national security and prevent terrorist propaganda, recruitment and financing. His statement did not identify the accounts or provide evidence supporting the allegations against individual accounts.
A day earlier, on 3 September, EngelliWeb, a monitoring project run by Turkey’s Freedom of Expression Association, reported that X had made several accounts inaccessible in Turkey. They included Aile Dayanışma Ağı ( the Family Solidarity Network), the news outlet soL Haber’s replacement account, and photographer and writer Fırat Erez.
The family network was established by relatives of politicians and municipal officials arrested in operations targeting municipalities run by the CHP and YENİ parties. For soL Haber, this was another restriction on its ability to reach readers: its previous account, with 924,000 followers, had already been blocked on 3 July. The outlet therefore faced a second account restriction in two months.
Bianet reported that an Istanbul criminal judgeship of peace had ordered restrictions on 21 X accounts under Article 8/A of Law No. 5651, following an investigation by the Istanbul chief public prosecutor’s office. The stated allegation was that their social media activity threatened national security.
Orders also covered İBB Tekzip, which responds to claims about Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, and İstanbul Gönüllüleri, a city volunteer platform. As of EngelliWeb’s report on 3 September, X had not yet made those two accounts inaccessible in Turkey.
Bianet also reported restrictions affecting accounts from different political backgrounds, including nationalist accounts and supporters of Ekrem İmamoğlu. The reported measures were therefore not confined to a single political group or type of account.
Duran did not say whether these separately documented X restrictions were included in the two-month total. They cannot therefore be presented as a confirmed breakdown of the same operation.
Where X had implemented the orders, users saw a notice saying the account had been withheld in Turkey following a legal demand. The restrictions covered entire accounts rather than individual posts, leaving readers unable to access the affected accounts’ reporting, commentary and public updates.
Sources
Presidency’s Directorate of Communications — Duran’s statement, 4 September 2026
EngelliWeb / Freedom of Expression Association — Account restrictions, 3 September 2026
Bianet — Restrictions affecting the Family Solidarity Network, soL Haber and other X accounts
Diken — Restrictions on soL Haber and the Family Solidarity Network, 3 September 2026
Legal Note
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights protects freedom of expression and the right to receive and impart information. Restrictions must be prescribed by law, pursue a legitimate aim and be necessary in a democratic society. National security is a permissible aim, but it does not remove the requirements of necessity and proportionality.
In Artı Media GmbH (application no. 2019/40078, judgment of 14 September 2023), Turkey’s Constitutional Court found violations of freedom of expression and the press arising from a blocking measure under Article 8/A of Law No. 5651. It found that the provision lacked adequate safeguards against arbitrary interference and that the authorities had failed to demonstrate a pressing social need through relevant and sufficient reasons.
In Ahmet Yıldırım v. Turkey (application no. 3111/10, judgment of 18 December 2012), the European Court of Human Rights found that the wholesale blocking of Google Sites violated Article 10. The domestic courts had not adequately considered less restrictive measures or the effects on lawful content. The judgment emphasised the need for strict limits on the scope of blocking orders and effective judicial review to prevent abuse.
