Campaigning on Hate? What the Law Allows in French Political Speech
A presidential candidate goes on live television and describes a group of people defined by their origin, as a “horde of barbarians”. Is that an opinion, or an offence?
France will vote on 18 April and 2 May 2027, and the campaign is already underway. Months before the first ballot, it is testing the question at the heart of this post: where does free political debate end and hate speech begin?
Political speech is protected, but not without limits
Under Article 10 of the ECHR political debate enjoys the highest level of protection.[1] The ECtHR considers freedom of political debate to be at the very heart of a democratic society. But Article 10 is not unlimited: States may restrict speech to protect the rights of others. Article 17 goes further: nobody can invoke the Convention to justify actions aimed at destroying the rights and freedoms it guarantees.
The European Court of Human Rights has applied these principles to campaigns. Féret v. Belgium (2009)[2] is the leading example. Daniel Féret, chairman of the Belgian party Front National and a member of parliament, distributed leaflets and posters during election campaigns between 1999 and 2001. They presented immigrant communities as criminal and as profiting from Belgium’s benefits. Belgian courts convicted him of inciting discrimination, segregation and hatred under the 1981 anti-racism law. In 2006 he received 250 hours of community service related to the integration of immigrants, a 10 month suspended prison sentence and a ten-year ban from standing for election.[3]
Féret argued that the conviction violated his freedom of expression. By four votes to three, Strasbourg found no violation of Article 10. The court held that politicians must avoid comments that foster intolerance, especially when they propose solutions to immigration issues. It added that the electoral context makes such speech more harmful, because campaign messages reach large audiences at a sensitive moment. The Court also considered that inciting hatred does not require a call to violence, insulting or ridiculing part of the population can be enough.
This case was close. Three judges dissented, arguing that the leaflets did not incite violence or any concrete discriminatory act and that the sanction was disproportionate. That disagreement shows how hard it is to separate harsh political opinion from hate speech.
A French case followed the same logic. In Zemmour v France[4] (2022), the Court upheld the conviction of the polemicist Éric Zemmour for provoking discrimination and religious hatred towards Muslims, based on xenophobic remarks made on television in 2016. It found that the fine of 3,000 euros was proportionate. The judges found that his remarks went beyond general debate about Islam or public policy, given the backdrop of recent terrorist attacks in France, the comments aimed to foster the rejection and exclusion of the Muslim community.
This ruling sets a powerful precedent for French electoral politics. It firmly establishes that political figures and media commentators cannot use the cover of public interest debates (such as immigration, secularism, or national identity) to disguise targeted hostility. While democratic countries highly protect free speech, this ruling makes it clear that politicians are not allowed to use their words to attack the safety and basic human rights of minority groups.
What the French Law prohibits
French law does not ban offensive ideas. It targets specific acts. Under the press law of 1881, as amended since the Pleven law of 1972, it is an offence to provoke discrimination, hatred or violence against a person or group because of their origin, ethnicity, nationality, race or religion.[5] Public insult and defamation on the same grounds are also punishable, and racist motives can aggravate other crimes.[6]
Where the law struggles in a campaign
On paper the rules are solid. In an election three problems appear.
Time. A campaign lasts months. Criminal proceedings last year. Zemmour’s remarks date from 2016, and Strasbourg ruled in December 2022. Even a successful case rarely produces a decision while voters are still deciding.
Short deadlines. Press offences normally prescribes after three months.[7] For provocation to hatred and similar offences, the period is one year.[8] For online messages, it starts when the content is first published. That leaves little time to file a complaint, investigate, and prosecute.
Dependence on complaint and referrals. Cases often rely on associations, elected officials or individuals to alert prosecutors. This makes enforcement uneven, and it makes every case look political, however carefully prosecutors explain their decision.
The online gap. Online platforms spread campaign messages instantly. France tried to oblige platforms to remove manifestly hateful content within 24 hours through the Avia Law[9], but the Conseil constitutionnel struck down the core of that obligation in 2020 as a disproportionate restriction on freedom of expression.[10] At EU level, the Digital Services Act requires platforms to address systemic risks, including risks to electoral processes, but it leaves the definition of illegal content to national law. The result is a mismatch, clear national offences, but no fast, rights-respecting way to apply them during a campaign.
What is happening now in France
The 2027 campaign is already testing these limits. On Sunday 18th October 2026, Eric Zemmour, a declared candidate in the 2027 presidential election, spoke on the channel LCI about the violence and looting that followed the national day of mobilisation against the cost of living on 17 of October. He described those involved as a horde of barbarians of North African and African origin, and invoked the “great replacement” theory. An LFI[11] deputy, Antoine Léaument, referred the remarks to the public prosecutor, and two reports were filed with Arcom, the audiovisual regulator. [12]
The legal question is whether the words go beyond harsh criticism and target a group because of its origin, which article 24 of the 1881 law punishes. For now these are referrals and reports, not charges. The prosecutor can open an investigation or close the file, the answer may come long after voters have decided.
Conclusion
French and European law set clear limits on political speech, but they act too slowly to protect the communities targeted while a campaign is still running. Closing that gap calls for faster procedure with safeguards during campaigns, public codes of conduct for parties and media, election-focused risk assessments by platforms under DSA.
If words that stigmatise whole communities go unchallenged while voters form their views, they can shape the election before any court rules. Protecting free debate and protecting communities from hatred are not opposites, both are conditions of a democratic election.
[1] Council of Europe, ‘Article 10’ (Human Rights Convention) https://www.coe.int/en/web/human-rights-convention/expression
[2] Féret v Belgium App no 156/07 (ECtHR, 16 July 2009).
[3] Dirk Voorhoof ‘ European Court of Human Rights: Case of Féret v. Belgium’ (IRIS 2009-8:1/1, European Audiovisieul Observatory).
[4] Zemmour v France App no 6353/19 (ECtHR, 20 December 2022).
[5]Article 24 of the press law 1881: “Any person who, by any of the means set forth in Article 23, incites discrimination, hatred, or violence against a person or group of persons on the basis of their origin or their membership in or non-membership in a particular ethnic group, a specific nation, race, or religion, shall be punished by one year of imprisonment and a fine of 45,000 euros, or by either of these two penalties alone.”
[6] Article 24 of the press law 1881.
[7] Article 65 of the press law 1881.
[8] Article 65-3of the press law 1881.
[9] 2020 French legislative act named after member of parliament Laetitia Avia. It required major social media platforms and search engines to remove “manifestly illegal” hate speech, racism, or religious hatred within 24 hours of being flagged. It mandated a faster one hour removal deadline for terrorist content and child sexual abuse matrial.
[10] European Digital Rights (EDRi), ‘French Avia Law Declared Unconstitutional: What Does This Teach Us at EU Level?’ (EDRi, 24 June 2020) https://edri.org/our-work/french-avia-law-declared-unconstitutional-what-does-this-teach-us-at-eu-level/.
[11] La France Insoumise: a left-wing political party and movement in France.
[12] Alexandrine Barelier, “Horde de barbares maghrébins et africains”: l’insoumis Léaument saisit la justice après des propos de Zemmour’ (Le JDD, 20 Octobre 2026). https://www.lejdd.fr/politique/horde-de-barbares-maghrebins-et-africains-linsoumis-leaument-saisit-la-justice-apres-des-propos-de-zemmour-186495